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In recent years, the country’s discourse around felon 
disenfranchisement has gained significant attention. Around the country, 
courts have addressed this issue in various forms. In nearly every case, felon 
disenfranchisement laws have been upheld.1 This Paper joins the discussion 
regarding t constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement. While much of the 
litigation to date has centered on rights guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution, this Paper focuses on the Minnesota Constitution. In a recent 
Minnesota district court case, Schroeder v. Minnesota Secretary of State, 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued the Minnesota Secretary 
of State, Steve Simon, arguing that Minnesota’s felon disenfranchisement 
statute violates the Minnesota Constitution.2 The Ramsey County court 
dismissed the case on August 19, 2020.3 This Paper argues that the district 
court erred in dismissing the case. In its order, the court relied on a narrow 
definition of fundamental rights, a selective historical analysis, and a national 
rather than international legal comparison.4 The court ultimately held that 
the power to regulate felon disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement lies 
exclusively with the legislative branch.5 While this may be true to an extent, 
this Paper argues that the legislature’s ability to regulate enfranchisement 
cannot go unconstrained. Indeed, it is the court’s job to ensure that the 
legislative branch operates within its constitutional limits.6 
                                                 
ǂ Lindsay Dreyer is a 2022 Juris Doctor candidate at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The 
author previously worked as a Fellow for the Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy 
Project, where she taught a high school government course. Special thanks to the students of 
her class, whose curiosity about felon disenfranchisement inspired this Paper. 
1 Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 369 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[F]elons fall outside the 
scope of the fundamental right to vote.”); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 170 (2d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814, 820 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]lthough the right to 
vote is generally considered fundamental, in the absence of any allegation that a challenged 
classification was intended to discriminate on the basis of race or other suspected criteria, 
statutes that deny felons the right to vote are not subject to strict judicial scrutiny.”); Johnson 
v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Having lost their voting rights, Plaintiffs 
lack any fundamental interest to assert.”); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1114–15 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (“[S]elective disenfranchisement or reenfranchisement of convicted felons must 
pass the standard level of scrutiny applied to state laws.”).  
2 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, No. 62-CV-19-7440 




4 See discussion infra Sections V.C–E. 
5 See discussion infra Sections V.C–E. 
6 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 




Section II of this Paper outlines the history of felon 
disenfranchisement in ancient Greece and the United States, where these 
laws have been adopted and expanded upon. Section III provides an 
overview of felon disenfranchisement today, paying close attention to the 
current trends in Minnesota. Section IV introduces Schroeder v. Minnesota 
Secretary of State, detailing the procedural posture of the case, the facts, and 
a brief overview of the legal arguments on each side. Finally, Section V 
provides a critique of the court’s decision. The court interpreted the 
Minnesota Constitution as granting the legislature virtually unchecked 
power over felon disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement. This Paper 
analyzes the court’s order and offers a more judicious interpretation of 
article VII of the Minnesota Constitution. 
II. HISTORY OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
A. European Roots 
The idea of barring certain individuals from participating in politics 
due to their criminal actions can be traced back over two thousand years to 
ancient Greece and Rome.7 In ancient Greece, those who committed 
certain serious offenses were “pronounced infamous” and barred from 
voting, making public speeches, and serving in the army.8 In ancient Rome, 
convicted criminals were branded with infamia and were similarly barred 
from holding office and voting.9 Additionally, those who “were convicted 
were exiled from society and carried their infamia with them as a badge of 
their dishonor.”10 Infamia was so damaging that some would “opt for exile 
over [a] trial” to spare themselves the public shame of being condemned 
with infamia before exile.11 
This practice of isolating and shaming individuals with criminal 
backgrounds was continuously adopted by succeeding nations. During the 
Renaissance, criminals were labeled “outlaws” as they were deemed to be 
outside the protections of the law, and thus could be killed with impunity.12 
The isolation and humiliation that came with losing one’s civil rights served 
                                                 
7 Alec Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement 
Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1059–60 (2002). 
8 Id. at 1059. 
9 Id. Infamia was a form of censure, which “applied to a citizen who was awaiting trial 
and followed them from their conviction to exile. If the individual ‘returned to Rome after 
exile, [they] could be killed on sight.’ Additionally, [their] property was confiscated upon 
conviction and [they were] stripped of [their] political and civil rights.” Shadman 
Zaman, Violence and Exclusion: Felon Disenfranchisement as a Badge of Slavery, 46 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 264 (2015). 
10 Zaman, supra note 9, at 265. 
11 Id. 
12 Ewald, supra note 7, at 1159. 




“both as a form of retribution and as a deterrent from crime.”13 Later, in 
medieval Europe, the principle of “civil death” was developed.14 Those who 
“commit[ted] serious crime[s] against society forfeit[ed] their civic 
personhood.”15 The criminal was said to be “dead in law.”16 Although laws 
allowing for disenfranchisement were widespread in ancient and early 
European society, this harsh penalty was reserved only for the most severe 
crimes.17 Furthermore, disenfranchisement was implemented on a case-by-
case basis and only after judicial pronouncement.18 It was not until the U.S. 
Civil War that a nation made disenfranchisement automatic and all-
encompassing. 
B. Pre-Civil War America 
 Early colonial disenfranchisement laws adopted the European 
concept of disenfranchisement and emerged in the 1600s.19 The colonies 
limited the penalty to certain offenses, usually related to voting or “egregious 
violations of the moral code.”20 After the Revolutionary War, states began 
to incorporate disenfranchisement clauses into their state constitutions. The 
Kentucky Constitution of 1792 disenfranchised those convicted of “bribery, 
perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors.”21 Mirroring the 
language of the Kentucky Constitution, the Louisiana Constitution of 1812 
barred those convicted of “bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or 
misdemeanors” from voting.22 Similarly, the Ohio Constitution of 1802 
limited disenfranchisement to crimes of “bribery, perjury, or otherwise 
infamous crime[s].”23 Minnesota chose slightly different language when 
outlining its disenfranchisement clause. The original draft of Minnesota’s 
Constitution in 1857 stated: 
 
                                                 
13 Angela Behrens, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and 
Legislative Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 236 
(2004). 
14 Christina Rivers, A Brief History of Felon Disenfranchisement and Prison 




16 Ewald, supra note 7, at 1059. 
17 Id. at 1060. 
18 Id. 
19 George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 103 (2005). 
20 JEAN CHUNG, THE SENT’G PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 3 
(Dec. 2019). 
21 KY. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 2. 
22 LA. CONST. of 1812, art. VI, § 4. 
23 OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 4. 




No person shall be qualified to vote at any election who shall be 
convicted of treason—or any felony—or of voting, or attempting to 
vote, more than once at any election—or of procuring or inducing 
any person to vote illegally at any election; Provided, That the 
Governor or the Legislature may restore any such person to civil 
rights.24 
 
The Minnesota Constitution was one of the first constitutions to use 
the word “felony” in its disenfranchisement clause.25 Of course, in the 
nineteenth century, the word “felony” had a notably different meaning than 
the modern understanding of the word.26 Thus, while the language of the 
clause differed from other states’ constitutions, the essence of the law was 
the same: disenfranchisement was reserved for egregious crimes and crimes 
related to dishonesty and voting. Moreover, despite the prevalence of 
disenfranchisement laws in the nineteenth century, the laws were poorly 
enforced prior to the Civil War.27 Given the nature of voting in the 
nineteenth century, it was difficult to verify if someone had been disqualified 
by a criminal conviction unless those attending the polls knew the 
disqualified person personally.28 Furthermore, there were few reported 
instances of voting crimes during this time.29 It was not until the Civil War 
that states became more concerned with monitoring the polls.30 
C. Post-Civil War 
 The post-Civil War expansion of voting rights threatened the power 
                                                 
24 T.F. ANDREWS, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION FOR THE TERRITORY OF MINNESOTA 540 (G.W. Moore ed. 1858). 
25 MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
26 In 1858, a Minnesota statute defined “felony” as “a public offense punishable with 
death, or which is, in the discretion of the court may be, punishable by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary or territorial prison.” MINN. STAT. § 87.3 (1858) (abrogated and presently 
codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.02 (2020)). Therefore, felonies were reserved for crimes 
punishable by death. 
27 JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 56 (2006). 
28 See id. at 53.  
In the town hall meeting, the disenfranchisement of offenders was enforceable 
through direct social means: the offender was known to the community, and 
easily barred from attempting to participate. The transition to a modern 
democratic regime . . . made direct (and systematic) enforcement more difficult 
because offenders could not necessarily be identified by sight.  
 
Id. 
29 Id. at 32. 
30 Id. at 55. “The most notable of these concerns was a fear of fraud, as well as more 
obscure fears on the part of some that the integrity of the ballot box would be tainted by the 
participation of unworthy electors.” Id. at 53. 




dynamics of the South. The ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments granted citizenship to an estimated four million formerly 
enslaved people.31 It also gave Black men the right to vote.32 More than a 
half-million Black men became eligible to vote in the South in the 1870s.33 
In some states, such as Mississippi, more than half of the state’s population 
was Black.34 In order to curtail the power of these new voters, practices were 
quickly put in place to prevent eligible Black voters from voting.35 For 
example, poll taxes and literacy tests were established to inhibit Black 
citizens from voting.36 Grandfather clauses restricted voter registration only 
to those whose grandfathers were qualified to vote before the Civil War, 
similarly targeting black voters.37 In Mississippi, the percentage of Black 
voting-age men registered to vote fell from 90% during Reconstruction, to 
6% in 1892.38 However, the law with the most long-lasting discriminatory 
impact on voting rights was the Thirteenth Amendment, which “carved out 
an exception allowing states to impose involuntary servitude on those who 
were convicted of crimes.”39 In the years following Reconstruction, 90% of 
those forced into convict leasing arrangements were Black.40 In Alabama, 
the percentage of nonwhite prisoners increased from 2% in 1850, to 74% in 
1870.41 
 Unsurprisingly, felon disenfranchisement laws were expanded 
upon and heavily enforced in the years following the Civil War. Alabama 
offers one notable example. In 1819, Alabama’s Constitution excluded 
those “convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or 
misdemeanors” from voting.42 This clause mirrored other 
disenfranchisement clauses during this period. However, in 1901, Alabama 
adopted a new constitution, which greatly expanded the scope of its 
disenfranchisement clause. The clause explicitly disenfranchised: 
                                                 
31 This number is approximate, based on data collected in the 1860 census. See U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1860, at viii (1860). 
32 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.”). 








39 ERIN KELLEY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., RACISM & FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: 
AN INTERTWINED HISTORY 1 (May 9, 2017). 
40 Id. at 2. 
41 Id. 
42 ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. VI, § 5. 





All idiots and insane persons; those who shall by reason of 
conviction of crime be disqualified from voting at the time of the 
ratification of this Constitution; those who shall be convicted of 
treason, murder, arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, 
larceny, receiving stolen property, obtaining property or money 
under false pretenses, perjury, subornation of perjury, robbery, 
assault with intent to rob, burglary, forgery, bribery, assault and 
battery on the wife, bigamy, living in adultery, sodomy, incest, 
rape, miscegenation, crime against nature, or any crime 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or of any 
infamous crime or crime involving moral turpitude; also, any 
person who shall be convicted as a vagrant or tramp, or of selling 
or offering to sell his vote or the vote of another, or of buying or 
offering to buy the vote of another, or of making or offering to 
make a false return in any election by the people or in any 
primary election to procure the nomination or election of any 
person to any office, or of suborning any witness or registrar to 
secure the registration of any person as an elector.43 
 
The president of Alabama’s Constitutional Convention made the 
purpose of the new provision clear, proclaiming the need to avert the 
“menace of Negro domination.”44 One official noted that “[t]he crime of 
wife-beating alone would disqualify 60 percent of the Negros.”45  
In 1890, Mississippi followed suit during its Constitutional 
Convention. The Convention expanded the disenfranchisement provision 
from “bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime[s],”46 to “bribery, burglary, 
theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretenses, perjury, 
forgery, embezzlement or bigamy, and [those] who [had not] paid . . . all 
taxes.”47 The delegates at the Convention made it clear that crimes added to 
the list were offenses “to which its weaker member [of society] were 
prone.”48 
Post-Civil War America marked the beginning of modern felon 
disenfranchisement. Many states amended their constitutions to expand the 
reach of disenfranchisement. But Minnesota’s provision was unique.49 The 
                                                 
43 ALA. CONST., art. VIII, § 182 (repealed 1996). 
44 Brent Staples, Opinion, The Racist Origins of Felon Disenfranchisement, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/the-racist-origins-of-felon-
disenfranchisement.html [https://perma.cc/U486-PRL2]. 
45 Id. 
46 MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §17. 
47 MISS. CONST., art. XII, § 241 (amended 1972). 
48 KELLEY, supra note 39, at 3. 
49 Unlike in the South, where states prohibited discreet crimes, see, e.g., ALA. CONST. 
of 1819, art. VI, § 5; MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §17, Minnesota’s constitutional 
prohibition was written broadly, which allowed the state to apply its prohibitions more 




state’s disenfranchisement provision did not need to change as it had in 
other states around the country. Rather, the language was already sufficiently 
broad so as to allow for a gradual expansion. The word “felony” could 
encompass whatever crimes the legislature wanted. While its language may 
have remained the same, the pervasiveness of disenfranchisement, its 
widespread application, and its impact on minority communities made 
Minnesota’s provision effectively identical to those in the South. 
 
III. DISENFRANCHISEMENT TODAY 
A. Modern Felon Disenfranchisement 
 Today, in the United States, there are six categories of felon 
disenfranchisement: (1) permanent disenfranchisement for all felons;50 (2) 
permanent disenfranchisement for some felons, depending on the offense;51 
(3) restoration of voting rights after completion of one’s sentence, including 
parole or probation;52 (4) restoration of voting rights after completion of 
one’s prison sentence and parole;53 (5) restoration of voting rights after 
release from prison;54 and (6) no disenfranchisement55 regardless of the 
offense.56 
 Approximately 2.5% of the United States’ voting age population, or 
6.1 million people, is disenfranchised due to a felony conviction.57 Of those 
disqualified from voting, 77% “live in their communities, either under 
                                                 
flexibly. See MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“The following persons shall not be entitled or 
permitted to vote at any election in this state: . . . a person who has been convicted of treason 
or felony, unless restored to civil rights; a person under guardianship, or a person who is 
insane or not mentally competent.”). 
50 Currently, only Kentucky and Virginia permanently disenfranchise people with felony 
convictions. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), AM. C.L. UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/voting-rights/voter-restoration/felony-disenfranchisement-laws-
map [https://perma.cc/BU2U-VHZL].  
51 Iowa, Colorado, Arizona, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida permanently 
disenfranchise some felons, depending on the offense. Id.   
52 Nineteen states, including Wisconsin, Washington, Idaho, and Georgia, restore voting 
rights after completion of one’s sentence. Id.  
53 New York and Connecticut restore voting rights after completion of one’s prison 
sentence and parole. Id. People on probation in these states can vote. Id.  
54 Eighteen states, including California, Illinois, North Dakota, and Michigan, restore 
voting rights after release from prison. Id. 
55 Only Maine and Vermont have no felon disenfranchisement laws. Id.  
56 John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International Law, and the Eighth 
Amendment, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 764 (2013). 
57 Christopher Uggen, Ryan Larson & Sarah Shannon, 6 Million Lost Voters: State-
Level Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016, SENT’G PROJECT (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-
felony-disenfranchisement-2016/ [https://perma.cc/P3WW-JBEU]. 




probation or parole supervision or having completed their sentence.”58 
Felon disenfranchisement policies disproportionately impact communities 
of color, with voting age Black Americans being four times more likely to 
lose their voting rights than the rest of the adult population.59 Furthermore, 
one in every thirteen Black adults is disenfranchised nationally, and, in 
several states,60 more than one in five Black adults is disenfranchised.61 
B. Felon Disenfranchisement in Minnesota 
 In Minnesota, the numbers are worse than the national average. 
One out of every eight Black Minnesotans is prohibited from voting due to 
a felony conviction.62 Currently, 53,000 Minnesotans outside of jail or prison 
cannot vote because of a felony conviction.63 Although Black citizens 
comprise 4% of Minnesota’s voting-age population, they account for more 
than 20% of disenfranchised voters living in the community.64 Comparably, 
Indigenous people make up less than 1% of Minnesota’s voting-age 
population but comprise nearly 7% of those disenfranchised.65 Minnesota’s 
probation and supervised release policies only exacerbate these numbers. 
Minnesota has the seventh-highest supervised population per capita in the 
country.66 
While the language of the disenfranchisement provision in the 
Minnesota Constitution has remained the same since 1857, its purpose and 
application have drastically changed. This Paper argues that article VII can 
no longer be used to justify modern disenfranchisement in Minnesota. As 
applied today, felon disenfranchisement under Minnesota Statutes section 
609.165 violates the Minnesota Constitution. 
IV. SCHROEDER V. MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF STATE 
In October 2019, the ACLU brought the issue of felon 
disenfranchisement to Ramsey County Court, challenging the 
constitutionality of Minnesota Statutes section 609.165.67 In response to the 
                                                 
58 CHUNG, supra note 20, at 2. 
59 Id. 
60 The states are Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Voting Rights Restoration, AM. C.L. UNION: MINN., https://www.aclu-
mn.org/en/campaigns/voting-rights-restoration [https://perma.cc/S28V-GHDN]. 
63 Id. 
64 ALCU-MN Sues to Restore Voting Rights in Minnesota, AM. C.L. UNION: MINN. 




67 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of 
State, No. 62-CV-19-7440 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Complaint]. 




complaint, both the state and the court narrowly defined the fundamental 
right to vote and applied a selective historical analysis. The court ultimately 
held that the power to regulate re-enfranchisement lies exclusively with the 
legislative branch.68 While this may be true to an extent, the legislature’s 
ability to regulate re-enfranchisement cannot go unconstrained. Indeed, it is 
the court’s job to ensure that the legislative branch operates within its 
constitutional limits.69 In Schroeder v. Minnesota Secretary of State, the 
court interpreted the Minnesota Constitution in a manner that gave the 
legislature virtually unchecked power over felon disenfranchisement and re-
enfranchisement. 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
 On October 21, 2019, the plaintiffs in Schroeder filed a complaint 
against the Minnesota Secretary of State seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief in Ramsey County, Minnesota.70 The complaint was written on behalf 
of four plaintiffs, each of whom were on parole, probation, or some other 
form of supervised release.71 As such, they were unable to vote.72 The 
complaint alleged that section 609.165,73 which outlines Minnesota’s system 
of re-enfranchisement after a felony conviction, violates the plaintiffs’ right 
to vote and equal protection under the Minnesota Constitution.74 
 The first plaintiff, Jennifer Schroeder, was convicted of drug 
possession in 2013.75 She was sentenced to one year in county jail and forty 
                                                 
68 Order, supra note 2, at 12. 
69 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
70 The Minnesota Voter Alliance, a self-identified election security group, sought limited 
intervention, contending that, as taxpayers, the organization had an interest in “meritless 
lawsuit[s].” See Notice of Limited Intervention to Assert the Defense of Lack of Private 
Cause of Action at 1, Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, No. 62-CV-19-7440 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
Apr. 3, 2020). Both the district court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that 
the organization failed to meet the factors necessary for both intervention of right and 
permissive intervention. See Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, 950 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2020). 
71 Schroeder, 950 N.W.2d at 74. 
72 Id. 
73 Adopted into law in 1963, the statute states the following:  
 
When a person has been deprived of civil rights by reason of conviction of a 
crime and is thereafter discharged, such discharge shall restore the person to all 
civil rights and to full citizenship, with full right to vote and hold office, the same 
as if such conviction had not taken place, and the order of discharge shall so 
provide. 
 
MINN. STAT. § 609.165, subdiv. 1 (2020). 
74 Complaint, supra note 67, at 2. 
75 Id. at 3. 




years of probation.76 Due to her felony conviction and probation, she will 
be unable to vote until 2053.77 Ms. Schroeder is now a drug and alcohol 
counselor and works with those struggling with addiction.78 The second 
plaintiff, Elizer Eugene Darris, served seventeen years in prison due to a 
second-degree homicide conviction.79 He was released from prison in 2016 
and will remain ineligible to vote until 2025.80 Since his release, Mr. Darris 
has worked on several political campaigns and volunteered as a mentor and 
re-entry coach.81 The third plaintiff, Christopher James Jecevicus-Varner, 
was convicted of a drug offense in 2014.82 He is currently serving twenty 
years on probation and will be unable to vote until 2034.83 Mr. Jecevicus-
Varner successfully completed drug treatment and is now working as an 
electrician.84 The final plaintiff, Tierre Davon Caldwell, was convicted of 
assault in 2010 and remains ineligible to vote due to his ongoing probation.85 
He is now a concrete laborer and has become involved in local politics.86 
B. The Court Order 
 On August 11, 2020, Judge Laura Nelson granted the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment.87 The order began with a discussion of the 
history of felon voting, borrowing most of the sources found in the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.88 The court noted that twenty-
four states practiced disenfranchisement during the pre-Civil War period.89 
Additionally, the court laid out Minnesota’s history of felon 
disenfranchisement.90 The court indicated that there had been several 
versions of disenfranchisement statutes before the current version, section 
609.165, was passed.91 Again appearing to borrow from the defendant’s 
                                                 
76 Id.  
77 Id.   
78 Schroeder v. Minn. Secretary of State, AM. C.L. UNION: MINN. (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/cases/schroeder-v-mn-secretary-state [https://perma.cc/T2LF-
58NT]. 
79 Complaint, supra note 67, at 3. 
80 Id. 
81 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 22, Schroeder v. Minn. Sec’y of State, No. 62-CV-19-7440 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 25, 2020) 
[hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment].  
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 3–4. 
86 Id. 
87 Order, supra note 2, at 13. 
88 Id. at 1. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 2–3. 




motion, the court concluded that section 609.165 was created with a clear 
governmental purpose: “to promote the rehabilitation of the defendant and 
his return to his community as an effective participating citizen.”92 
 Next, the court analyzed the equal protection claim. The court held 
that because Minnesota’s Constitution explicitly limited the right to vote, 
persons convicted of a felony lacked any fundamental right to vote under 
the state Constitution.93 Thus, a fundamental right was not at issue. The 
court noted that while a heightened rational basis review is, at times, used 
when a statutory classification adversely affects one race more than another, 
that basis of review was not appropriate in Schroeder.94 The court reasoned 
that the heightened rational basis review had not been applied by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court since 1991,95 and the court stated that any right 
or restriction triggered by a criminal conviction would have a similar 
disproportionate impact on minority communities.96 Thus, the court 
concluded, a heightened basis of review was not practical. Therefore, the 
court applied rational basis review. 
Under regular rational basis review, the court found that a legitimate 
government interest existed and concluded that the law did not violate the 
state’s Equal Protection Clause.97 The court used a similar analysis in 
evaluating the due process claim. Since a fundamental right was not at issue, 
rational basis review again applied.98 The court held that the means used to 
achieve the governmental purpose of rehabilitation under section 609.165 
were reasonable.99 
The district court then granted summary judgment for the defendant.100 
On September 30, 2020, the plaintiffs served a notice of appeal to the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals,101 which the appellate court affirmed on May 
24, 2021.102 On August 10, 2021, Minnesota Supreme Court granted 
Schroeder’s petition for review.103 Oral arugments are scheduled for 
November 30, 2021.104 
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A. The Court’s Reliance on the Federal Standard 
 Both the state and federal courts’ unwillingness to strike down felon 
disenfranchisement laws stems from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in Richardson v. Ramirez.105 In Richardson, 
three California residents filed a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court 
of California to compel California county election officials to register them 
to vote.106 They claimed that California’s felon disenfranchisement law, 
which disenfranchised persons convicted of an “infamous crime,” violated 
their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.107 The Supreme Court of California reviewed 
the statute with strict scrutiny and held that the statute was unconstitutional.108 
The Supreme Court of the United States then granted certiorari.109 
 The United States Supreme Court looked to Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for guidance. Section 2 states: 
 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole 
number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of 
a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any 
of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of 
age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which 
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number 
of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.110 
 
The Court concluded that Section 2 affirmatively sanctioned the 
exclusion of felons from voting.111 Thus, felon disenfranchisement laws were 
not to be afforded strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.112 
Rather, the Court held that the appropriate standard of review was rational 
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basis review.113 Because the respondents could not prove discriminatory 
intent, the case was reversed.114 Since Richardson, the Fourteenth 
Amendment has proven a nearly insurmountable barrier for convicted 
felons seeking to invalidate felon disenfranchisement laws.115 Without 
evidence of the legislature’s intent to purposefully discriminate, 
disenfranchisement laws will likely survive a rational basis review. Not 
surprisingly, few disenfranchisement cases have been able to prove 
discriminatory intent. 
Case law illustrates just how difficult it is to prove discriminatory intent. 
In Hunter v. Underwood, the Court held that an Alabama Constitutional 
provision disenfranchising those convicted of crimes involving moral 
turpitude violated the Fourteenth Amendment.116 The Court cited evidence 
from the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901, where the president 
stated that the purpose of the Convention was to “establish white supremacy 
in the State.”117 Those at the Convention specifically selected crimes “that 
were thought to be more commonly committed by [B]lacks.”118 Hunter 
created the standard for striking down a disenfranchisement law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a standard few cases thereafter have met.  
 In Schroeder, Judge Nelson’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment mirrored the Court’s reasoning in Richardson.119 
Similar to Richardson, the judge looked to the language of the Minnesota 
Constitution to determine if voting was a fundamental right.120 Because the 
Minnesota Constitution affirmatively sanctions the disenfranchisement of 
felons,121 the judge held that those convicted of a felony do not have a 
fundamental right to vote in Minnesota.122 The judge concluded her order 
by quoting the majority opinion in Richardson, emphasizing that the power 
to change felon disenfranchisement laws lies with the legislature.123 If the 
legislature fails to make changes, the order quoted, “their failure is some 
evidence, at least, of the fact that there are two sides to the argument.”124 
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 Ultimately, the district court in Schroeder, like the Court in 
Richardson, held that the legislature has virtually unconstrained power to 
regulate felon disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement. Under 
Richardson, legislatures have the complete authority to define which crimes 
fall under the “other crimes” provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, so 
long as the legislature does not explicitly state its intention to discriminate—
an absurdly low bar. Similarly, under Schroeder, the Minnesota legislature 
has unchecked power to define what crimes constitute a felony, a definition 
which has expanded over time. In an effort to create clear boundaries 
between the legislature and the judiciary, the courts have allowed for the 
gradual erosion of voting rights in Minnesota and in states across the 
country.125 In the process, felon disenfranchisement provisions have been 
exploited and expanded.126  
While state legislatures have the power to create felon 
disenfranchisement laws, the courts have the power to set constitutional 
limits on their expansion.127 Richardson chose not to address the 
constitutional limits on the expansion of felon disenfranchisement.128 
Accordingly, state and federal courts, such as the court in Schroeder, have 
also chosen to avoid this question and instead align their reasoning with the 
majority opinion in Richardson.129 But the basic question in Richardson 
remains unanswered. In looking to define the constitutional limits of felon 
disenfranchisement, Richardson’s dissenting opinion provides a sound 
roadmap. 
B. The Power of Dissent 
 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote the dissenting 
opinion in Richardson.130 In discussing the constitutionality of California’s 
disenfranchisement law, Justice Marshall began with a historical analysis of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. While the majority concluded that Congress 
intended to affirmatively sanction felon disenfranchisement in Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,131 Justice Marshall interpreted the Section’s 
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intent more narrowly. According to him, as acknowledged by the majority,132 
Section 2 was the result of a “compromise” between the North and the 
South.133 The northern Republicans were concerned that the increased 
representation in the South would impact their political dominance. They 
also knew that southern Black men were more likely to support the 
Republican party.134 Rather than force the South to enfranchise Black men, 
Section 2 was a compromise that gave the South a choice: “enfranchise 
Negro voters or lose congressional representation.”135 In that sense, Section 
2 was intended to be a “remedy supplementary” to the other sections in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.136 The Section was intended to expand, not limit, 
enfranchisement overall. The provisions of Section 2, Justice Marshall 
argued, were not intended to sanction election discrimination.137 Moreover, 
they were “not forever immunized from evolving standards of equal 
protection scrutiny.”138 Thus, Justice Marshall concluded, all voting 
restrictions, even the two types of disenfranchisement listed in Section 2, 
were subject to strict scrutiny under Section 1 of the Amendment. 
 Justice Marshall additionally contended that the “other crimes” 
language in Section 2 was a congressional afterthought and that the language 
was not meant to have such broad implications on voting. There is little 
evidence as to why Congress added the “other crimes” language to Section 
2 in the first place.139 Section 2 went to the joint committee containing only 
the phrase “participation in rebellion,” but left the committee with “other 
crimes” inexplicably tacked on.140 Justice Marshall argued that the lack of 
legislative history emphasized that Congress did not intend for the words to 
have such great significance.141 Many states had similar language in their state 
constitutions at the time.142 As noted above, these provisions were not 
enforced before the Civil War. 143  Rather, they were largely remnants of “the 
fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and doubtless [had] been brought 
forward into modern statutes without fully realizing either the effect of its 
literal significance or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our 
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system of government.”144 In other words, disenfranchisement clauses were 
largely symbolic limitations on voting. The symbolic nature of 
disenfranchisement laws during this time and the lack of legislative history 
further demonstrate that Congress likely did not intend for the words to be 
read as separate from the other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 The dissent’s reasoning could similarly be applied to the Minnesota 
Constitution’s sanction of felon disenfranchisement. While section 1 of 
article VII allows the legislature to disqualify those “convicted of treason or 
felony” from voting, 145 the legislative history of the provision shows that the 
drafters of the state constitution had little idea of what this provision meant 
or the impact it would have on our ability to vote in the state. 
In discussing this provision during the Minnesota Constitutional 
Convention, one delegate moved to strike the entire section.146 He noted 
that the provision was “certainly a very stringent one, and difficult of 
application, and in many cases would work great hardship.”147 The delegate 
further noted that the felony language of the section was “unusual” and that 
he had “never seen it in any other Constitution.”148 The delegate’s motion to 
strike the provision did not succeed, but the discussion demonstrates the 
nature of disenfranchisement laws during the nineteenth century.149 Such 
laws existed for hundreds of years in Europe and Colonial America,150 yet 
people still did not fully understand their significance. This lack of 
understanding was due largely to the lack of enforcement of 
disenfranchisement laws before the Civil War.151 These clauses were historic 
remnants. States included them in their constitutions but had little idea as 
to how the laws would be applied.  
Likely, these states did not care how or if these provisions would be 
applied at all. So few people were convicted of felonies during this period 
that the delegates likely did not envision this provision having any real 
impact on the state. In the 1850s, 0.115% of the United States population 
was convicted of a crime each year, and only 0.029% of the population was 
incarcerated.152 Moreover, notions of parole and supervised release had not 
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yet been introduced in America.153 In contrast, today, 2.5% of the population 
is either incarcerated or under some form of supervised release.154 The 
number of people incarcerated or under supervised release is more than 
eighty-five times the number in the 1850s. Black people are 
disproportionately represented in these numbers. In Minnesota, an 
estimated 15 to 20% of African Americans have a felony conviction.155 
Nationally, the numbers are higher. Around 33% of African Americans 
have a felony conviction.156 Fifty-three thousand African Americans are on 
probation or supervised release in Minnesota and currently cannot vote.157 
To put that in perspective, only 44,593 votes separated Hilary Clinton from 
Donald Trump in Minnesota during the 2016 general election.158 In other 
words, felon disenfranchisement laws now have the power to swing 
elections. 
The drafters of the Minnesota Constitution neither intended nor 
foresaw the great impact this provision would have on the state. A look at 
the legislative history indicates the drafters likely felt obligated to include 
such a provision in the constitution and did not seem to care about its 
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practical application.159 The legislative history does not suggest the drafters 
intended to give the legislature limitless authority to expand felon 
disenfranchisement. Rather, the notes from the debates make clear that 
they, in fact, intended for the legislature to increase enfranchisement by 
“restor[ing] civil rights to any person who may be convicted for violating the 
provisions of this section.”160 Furthermore, as Justice Marshall argued 
regarding the U.S. Constitution, the disenfranchisement sanctioned in this 
provision is not frozen and “forever immunized from evolving standards of 
equal protection scrutiny.”161 We are “not confined to historic notions of 
equality.”162 While the Minnesota Constitution facially sanctions 
disenfranchisement of those convicted of felonies, there is no reason why 
the statutes created under this provision should not be viewed with strict 
scrutiny as an infringement on the fundamental right to vote, especially given 
our evolving notions of equality. To exclude these statutes from the Equal 
Protection Clause is to immunize them from any meaningful review. 
C. The Expansion of the Word “Felony” and the Court’s Selective 
Historical Analysis 
There is no question that the Minnesota Constitution disqualifies those 
convicted of a “felony” from voting. The question then becomes, what 
qualifies as a felony under the Minnesota Constitution? First, it is helpful to 
track the historical evolution of the word felony. In feudal times, serious 
crimes were not necessarily felonies.163 To qualify as a felony, a crime had 
to involve some breach of faith or truth, which was deemed an essential 
element of the lord to vassal relationship.164 Without that violation of truth, 
even the most wicked crimes were not considered felonies.165 After the 
Norman Conquest of England, the feudal concept of felony was reshaped 
by the common law.166 Under common law, felonies were defined by the 
punishment. Crimes that were punishable by death or loss of property were 
considered felonies.167 There were nine traditional common law felonies: 
murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, robbery, rape, sodomy, mayhem, 
and larceny.168 These common law felonies were brought from Europe to 
America. Colonial America continued to define felonies based on their 
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punishments. In the early 1800s, America continued to use the common 
law definition of felony. The 1832 Webster’s Dictionary defined felony as 
“[i]n common law, any crime which incurs the forfeiture of lands or goods. 
All offenses punishable by death are felonies.”169 
Minnesota was no different. In 1858, a felony in Minnesota was 
defined as a “public offense punishable with death, or which is, in the 
discretion of the court may be, punishable by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary or territorial prison.”170 Even after Minnesota began enacting 
criminal statutes, the statutes largely followed the common law definitions 
of various crimes.171 Thus, when the delegates of the Minnesota Constitution 
drafted section 1 of article VII, their idea of felony was a rather narrow one. 
Those who committed felonies in Minnesota were subject to the death 
penalty.172 Since then, our definition of felony has continued to broaden. As 
our definition of felony has expanded, so has article VII, section 1 of the 
Minnesota Constitution. Today in Minnesota, no crime is punishable by 
death.173 Nevertheless, felonies remain a category of crimes in Minnesota. A 
felony is currently defined in Minnesota as “a crime for which a sentence of 
imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed.”174 In the past 
twenty-five years, Minnesota’s incarceration rate has increased by 150%.175 
The state has also created an entire system of parole and supervised release 
that did not exist in 1858. Minnesota’s criminal justice system and, with that, 
the categorization of crime has drastically changed. 
 As such, the word “felony” in article VII, section 1, should be read 
narrowly, and the historical definition of felony should apply. The 
Minnesota Constitution should be read to disqualify from voting only those 
convicted of crimes punishable by death. All other crimes the legislature has 
subsequently included in its definition of felony fall outside of the scope of 
the Minnesota Constitution. The legislature, of course, has full authority to 
change the definition of felony and thus expand felon disenfranchisement. 
However, any expansion of disenfranchisement that exceeds the common 
law definition of felony should be subject to strict scrutiny. States, including 
Minnesota, have pushed back on this idea largely because they are aware 
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that their current disenfranchisement laws could not survive review under 
strict scrutiny.176 While the government would likely argue that convicted 
felons, even under an expansive definition, should not be able to vote while 
incarcerated, any governmental interests of felon disenfranchisement after 
a person has been released from prison are tenuous at best.177 
D. The Court’s Narrow Definition of Fundamental Right 
The United States Supreme Court has declared the right to vote “the 
essence of a democratic society.”178 Any restrictions on the right to vote 
“strike at the heart of representative government.”179 Moreover, Minnesota 
has recognized the right to vote as a fundamental right.180 The Supreme 
Court of Minnesota has affirmed that “[n]o right is more precious in a free 
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the 
laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.”181 Not only has the court 
acknowledged that the right to vote is fundamental, but it recognized that 
“[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined.”182 While the right to vote may be restricted under the 
Minnesota Constitution, these restrictions cannot go unchecked, as voting 
is a fundamental right. 
Under the narrow definition of felony provided in the Minnesota 
Constitution, only those convicted of treason or a crime punishable by death 
fall outside of the scope of the fundamental right to vote. This interpretation 
of the provision best protects an individual’s right to vote and aligns with the 
state’s view of voting as a fundamental right.183 
In Minnesota, the exercise of political franchise is a fundamental 
right.184 In Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
a “restriction that . . . denies the franchise to citizens who are otherwise 
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qualified” to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny.185 On the other hand, if 
the restriction is “more in the nature of a simple electoral regulation,” then 
rational basis scrutiny applies.186 Felon disenfranchisement is not a “simple 
electoral regulation,” so strict scrutiny should apply. The court in 
Schroeder, however, disagreed.187 While the court agreed that voting is a 
fundamental right, the court explained that the right is limited by the 
Minnesota Constitution.188 The “language of the Minnesota Constitution 
determines what is and is not a fundamental right.”189 Thus, the court 
concluded that a person who has been convicted of a felony does not have 
a fundamental right to vote in Minnesota.190 The court arrived at this 
conclusion by reading article VII expansively. According to the court, the 
Minnesota Constitution disqualifies every person whom the legislature 
deems to be a felon from voting. The power to disenfranchise and re-
enfranchise, therefore, lies exclusively with the legislature, and this power is 
unlimited. 
Conversely, the plaintiffs argued that the “enumerated exceptions to 
voting rights” should be “implemented in a manner that narrowly tailors 
deprivation of the right to vote to accomplish a well-defined and compelling 
government interest.”191 The plaintiffs’ reasoning is sound; article VII should 
be read narrowly to ensure the protection of the right to vote. Any expansion 
of disenfranchisement should be analyzed under strict scrutiny. As Justice 
Marshall stated in the Richardson dissent, “the right to vote ‘is of the essence 
of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart 
of the representative government.’”192 It follows then that article VII should 
be interpreted narrowly to support this fundamental right of our democratic 
society.    
The court also reasoned that the Minnesota Constitution sanctions 
several other different types of voting restrictions.193 Age, residence, and 
competency are other restrictions that the Minnesota Constitution places on 
voting.194 Therefore, the right to vote is a limited one. However, the felony 
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restriction is distinct from the other restrictions in the state’s constitution. 
Age, residence, and competency are all either defined in the constitution or 
have proven to be relatively stagnant terms. Age and residence requirements 
are explicitly outlined in the Minnesota Constitution.195 Those restrictions 
are clearly defined and cannot be changed absent a constitutional 
amendment. Moreover, to be disqualified from voting due to 
incompetency, the constitution requires that an individual be declared 
legally incompetent through a court order.196 While the definition of legal 
incompetence is not clearly expressed in the constitution, this term has not 
been expanded in the way the felony restriction has.197 In fact, in Minnesota, 
the legislature has worked to reform laws regarding voting incapacity to 
remove “over- and underinclusive terminology.”198  
In contrast, the felony restriction is unique in its ability to expand and 
evolve over time. The felony definition of today is remarkably different 
from the felony definition of the nineteenth century.199 The term continues 
to expand, and, as a result, so does the number of people barred from 
voting. Courts have refused to notice this distinction and continue to treat 
felony disenfranchisement the same as any other restriction on voting. 
However, no other voting restriction has been exploited in the same way. 
The courts that uphold such exploitation, like the court in Schroeder, are 
unable to find any legislative history that supports such expansion. The 
delegates of the Minnesota Constitutional Convention drafted article VII at 
a time when the definition of felony was limited, and felon 
disenfranchisement clauses were not heavily enforced.200 Their short 
discussion of the provision is further evidence that the delegates did not 
anticipate that the clause would have a great impact on the voting 
population.201 In fact, as noted above, the delegates themselves seemed 
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unsure as to how the provision would impact the state.202 While courts cite 
widespread historical use of felon disenfranchisement laws as justification 
for their use today, in reality, these laws are markedly different.203 Courts in 
Minnesota would be justified in treating the expansion of felon 
disenfranchisement with strict scrutiny. Doing so would both respect the 
language of the Minnesota Constitution and protect the fundamental right 
to vote. 
E. International Law as a Comparison 
 Although felon disenfranchisement laws are common in the United 
States, the same cannot be said for the rest of the democratic world. Felon 
disenfranchisement is “far outside the international norm.”204 The 
international community has rejected permanent disenfranchisement, and 
a majority of European countries impose no ban on felon voting 
whatsoever.205 In most European countries, governments even facilitate 
voting by those convicted of felonies.206 Other European countries ban only 
some prisoners from voting, usually those serving long sentences for certain 
serious crimes.207 That said, a minority of European countries do 
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disenfranchise all prisoners.208 
American disenfranchisement laws differ from European laws in two 
respects. First, American disenfranchisement laws are unique in their ability 
to reach outside of prisons. In all but sixteen states, American 
disenfranchisement laws affect not only people in prison but also those 
living in the community, either on probation, parole, or after completing 
every aspect of their sentence.209 Second, European countries with 
disenfranchisement laws have made clear that disenfranchisement is 
designed and delivered as a form of punishment.210 In contrast, most 
defenders of disenfranchisement laws in the United States tend to avoid 
justifying the laws as a form of punishment.211 Rather, proponents insist that 
they are regulatory measures.212 
 The United Nations “has specifically criticized the United States’ 
disenfranchisement policy.”213 The United States signed and ratified two 
treaties—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD)—which are both critical of blanket voting bans.214 
A General Comment to the ICCPR provides that “[i]f conviction for an 
offense is a basis for suspending the right to vote, the period of such 
suspension should be proportionate to the offense and the sentence.”215 The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee oversees the implementation of 
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the ICCPR, and the Committee has charged the United States with violating 
the treaty. The Committee recommended that the United States “adopt 
appropriate measures to ensure that states restore voting rights to citizens 
who have fully served their sentences and those who have been released on 
parole.”216 Additionally, the ICERD monitoring body, the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, noted that it was “concerned 
about the political disenfranchisement of a large segment of the ethnic 
minority population who are denied the right to vote by disenfranchising 
laws and practices,” which is potentially a violation of articles 1 and 5 of the 
ICERD.217 
 In recognizing the right to vote as fundamental, most foreign courts 
examine disenfranchisement legislation by applying a proportionality 
review, which is often seen as a higher threshold of review than the 
American strict scrutiny test.218 Under proportionality review, many foreign 
disenfranchisement laws have been struck down.219 For example, South 
Africa’s Constitutional Court addressed the issue of whether the 
government had the authority to deny prisoners the right to vote in Minister 
of Home Affairs v. National Institute of Crime Prevention and the 
Reintegration of Offenders (“NICRO”).220 The court failed to find a 
legitimate government interest justifying disenfranchisement and held that 
the government could not deprive prisoners of the right to vote simply “to 
correct a public misconception as to its true attitude to crime and 
criminals.”221 Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights applied 
proportionality review to a United Kingdom law that operated as a blanket 
ban on inmate voting.222 The court struck down the blanket ban but 
reasoned that some disenfranchisement was acceptable to allow a 
democracy to take “steps to protect itself against activities intended to 
destroy the rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention.”223 Still, the court 
held that there must be a “discernible and sufficient link between the 
sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned.”224 
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 While this transnational judicial discourse is not binding on the 
United States, it can and has been discussed in judicial opinions rendered 
by the United States Supreme Court. In New York v. United States, Justice 
Frankfurter referred to Argentinean, Australian, Brazilian, and Canadian 
constitutions in his majority opinion.225 Additionally, in Lawrence v. Texas, 
the Court cited European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence in holding 
that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to privacy.226 In Roper v. 
Simmons, when examining the application of capital punishment in cases 
involving an offender under the age of eighteen, the Court cited several non-
binding treaty provisions and examined Canadian, British, and Indian 
jurisprudence.227 Similarly, courts in Minnesota could use transnational 
judicial discourse to bolster a decision to restrict the expansion of felon 
disenfranchisement. Rather than looking solely at comparative state laws, 
which are also not binding in Minnesota, courts could broaden their analysis 
to include a discussion on the constitutionality of disenfranchisement laws 
worldwide. This is an especially critical discussion given that the United 
States continues to face harsh criticism for its widespread use of blanket 
felon disenfranchisement laws. 
F. Under Strict Scrutiny, Minn. Stat. § 609.165 Violates Minnesota’s 
Equal Protection Clause 
 Section 609.165 easily fails strict scrutiny review, which is likely why 
courts have made a concerted effort to avoid applying this standard. 
However, after concluding that all voting, outside of the narrow restrictions 
authorized by article VII, is a fundamental right, section 609.165 should be 
reviewed under strict scrutiny. Section 609.165 applies to crimes other than 
those punishable by death and is thus an expansion of disenfranchisement 
and a direct infringement on the fundamental right to vote. As such, this 
direct infringement is subject to strict scrutiny.228 Under strict scrutiny review, 
the state must show that the current disenfranchisement scheme is 
“narrowly tailored and reasonably necessary to further a compelling 
governmental interest.”229 The compelling governmental interest must be 
specifically stated, and the statute must have an “actual, and not just . . . 
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theoretical” connection to the governmental interest.230 
In Schroeder, the government stated that the purpose of adopting 
section 609.165 was “to promote the rehabilitation of the defendant and his 
return to his community as an effective participating citizen.”231 While that 
may have been the presumed purpose, there is no evidence that the statute 
did, in fact, promote rehabilitation. Studies show that non-voters are more 
likely to be rearrested than voters.232 Although these studies acknowledge 
that the data does not provide proof of direct causation, it is clear that 
“[v]oting appears to be part of a package of pro-social behavior that is linked 
to desistance from crime.”233 Furthermore, the state cites no evidence 
supporting the proposition that disenfranchising those on probation, parole, 
or some form of supervision promotes rehabilitation. Evidence shows the 
opposite. Preventing those on probation or parole from voting actually 
stifles rehabilitation, as those who can vote are less likely to recidivate and 
more likely to successfully complete probation.234 Thus, under strict 
scrutiny, the state would have a difficult time articulating a governmental 
interest that is served by the statute. 
The state could further argue that the felon disenfranchisement statute 
is necessary to prevent voting fraud. This is a common argument among 
proponents of felon disenfranchisement laws.235 Again, there is little 
evidence to support this argument, especially given the state’s blanket 
restriction of all felonies regardless of the type of crime committed.236 
Another common argument made by disenfranchisement proponents is 
that felons have forfeited their right to participate in government.237 Others 
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believe that ex-felons are more likely to favor corrupt candidates or more 
lenient criminal codes.238 Still, these arguments lack solid evidentiary 
support. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that states 
may not fence out a class of voters because of concerns about how they 
might vote.239 
 Even assuming there was a legitimate government interest served by 
the statute, the state would have to prove that the statute is narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest. Statutes that are not “precisely tailored to serve that 
compelling state interest” must be invalidated.240 In terms of voter fraud, this 
argument is outlined in the dissenting opinion of Richardson v. Ramirez. 
Disenfranchisement provisions, such as section 609.165, are “patently both 
overinclusive and underinclusive.”241 The statutes are overinclusive in that 
they encompass all former felons, and “there has been no showing that ex-
felons generally are any more likely to abuse the ballot than the remainder 
of the population.”242 Moreover, the provisions are also underinclusive in 
that “many of those convicted of violating election laws are treated as 
misdemeanants and are not barred from voting at all.”243 Thus, a portion of 
those at risk of committing voter fraud are not included within the 
provisions. 
 Furthermore, if the statute’s compelling government interest is 
rehabilitation, the statute most certainly could have been drafted in a less 
restrictive way. The statute could disenfranchise persons incarcerated 
following a felony conviction and re-enfranchise those released from prison, 
including those on probation, parole, or supervised release. This would 
constitute a less restrictive alternative and would still achieve the 
government’s interest in rehabilitation. To survive strict scrutiny review, the 
state would need to explain why expanding the statute to include people on 
parole, probation, and supervised release is necessary to achieve the 
governmental interest of rehabilitation. Given the contradictory evidence, 
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this would be a difficult argument for the state to make. Therefore, under 
strict scrutiny review, section 609.165, as it is currently written, would likely 
fail. 
G. Minnesota Statutes Section 609.165 Fails a Rational Basis Review 
 Even under rational basis review, Minnesota’s current 
disenfranchisement scheme should not survive. The Minnesota 
Constitution applies “an independent Minnesota constitutional standard of 
rational basis review,” which is more stringent than the federal standard.244 
This heightened standard of review requires, 
(1) The distinctions which separate those included 
within the classification from those excluded must not be 
manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and 
substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable 
basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions 
and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or 
relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an 
evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar 
to the class and the prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose 
of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately 
attempt to achieve.245 
 
The court noted that this heightened standard of review “is particularly 
appropriate . . . in a case such as this where the challenged classification 
appears to impose a substantially disproportionate burden on the very class 
of persons whose history inspired the principles of equal protection.”246 
Given the immensely disproportionate impact section 609.165 has on 
people of color, this heightened standard of review would be an appropriate 
standard of review to apply to this case. 
The district court in Schroeder, however, disagreed.247 The court 
ultimately chose not the apply Russell’s heightened standard of review.248 In 
its order, the court first noted that the Russell heightened rational basis 
standard has not been used by the Minnesota Supreme Court to strike down 
a law since 1991.249 This statement is misleading. While this heightened 
rational basis standard has not been used to strike down a law since 1991, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court does, in fact, continue to use Russell when 
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analyzing statutes.250 In a July 2020 decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
emphasized the Russell standard, stating that:  
 
[W]e hold lawmakers to a higher standard of evidence when a 
statutory classification demonstrably and adversely affects one 
race differently than other races, even if the lawmakers’ purpose 
in enacting the law was not to affect any race differently.251  
 
The court concluded by stating that Minnesota’s equal protection 
standard is not less deferential to the legislature than the federal standard, 
“[b]ut where a law demonstrably and adversely affects one race different 
than other races . . . our precedent under the Minnesota Constitution 
requires more of lawmakers . . . than does the Fourteenth Amendment.”252 
Despite the noted adverse impact that felon disenfranchisement has in 
Minnesota, the court decided not to apply the heightened standard of 
review. To justify this decision, the court argued that the statute is “not the 
source of the disenfranchisement.”253 Rather, the court stated that the 
Minnesota Constitution was the source of the disenfranchisement, while 
section 609.165 is the “method of restoring the right to vote.”254 Again, this 
statement is misleading. The Minnesota Constitution grants the legislature 
both the power to disenfranchise and to re-enfranchise. Section 609.165 
does both. The statute expands the disenfranchisement authorized by the 
Minnesota Constitution, as the statute uses an expansive definition of 
“felony” and applies to those on probation and parole, neither of which 
existed at the time the Minnesota Constitution was drafted. Thus, by 
expanding disenfranchisement, the statute serves to disenfranchise as well 
as re-enfranchise. 
Finally, the court’s order states that the enactment of section 609.165 
in 1983 “converted the process of restoring the right to vote from a 
discretionary model to an automatic one.”255 In so doing, the court reasoned 
that the statute “expanded re-enfranchisement.”256 That the statute is less 
restrictive than its predecessors is irrelevant. The Russell standard for 
heightened review applies when a law “adversely affects one race different 
than other races.”257 In Minnesota, African Americans comprise 4% of 
Minnesota’s voting-age population but account for more than 20% of 
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disenfranchised voters.258 Furthermore, American Indians comprise less 
than 1% of Minnesota’s voting-age population but comprise 7% of those 
disenfranchised.259 The statute clearly has an adverse effect on people of 
color. As such, the heightened standard of review should apply. The judge’s 
phrasing of the statute as one that “expanded re-enfranchisement” does not 
change the analysis under Russell. 
Under this heightened standard of review, the government needs 
“actual as opposed to theoretical factual justification for a statutory 
classification.”260 The government needs to do more than simply state that 
the statute was enacted “to promote the rehabilitation of the defendant and 
his return to his community as an effective participating citizen.”261 The 
government needs actual factual justification, proving that the statute does, 
in fact, promote rehabilitation. In neither the State’s memoranda nor the 
court’s order is such evidence provided. 
The court ultimately applied a traditional rational basis review, similar 
to the analysis in federal courts. As the court notes, “[t]o survive rational 
basis review the challenged statute must be ‘a rational means of achieving a 
legislative body’s legitimate policy goal.’”262 The court reasoned that because 
the legislature’s policy goal in enacting section 609.165 was to promote 
rehabilitation by automatically restoring civil rights to persons convicted of 
felonies after their sentence ended, the statute was a rational means of 
achieving the legislature’s goal.263 The court stated that “[a]lthough the 
Plaintiffs advocate that the line should have been drawn elsewhere, this 
Court does not have the ability to substitute its judgment for that of the 
legislature.”264 The statute, the court concluded, expanded re-
enfranchisement.265  
While it is true that the statute converted the individualized restoration 
of rights to an automatic one, the statute did not expand restoration. The 
1907 statute required that a person convicted of a felony wait “one year from 
the date of the judgment” to apply to the district court for reinstatement of 
civil rights.266 The one year started from the “date of judgment,” not the date 
of release, contrary to what is stated in the court’s order.267 That meant that 
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individuals serving sentences of one year or longer could apply to the courts 
for reinstatement of their civil rights immediately after being released from 
prison. Therefore, under the 1907 statute, the maximum amount of time 
an individual was required to spend outside of prison without the ability to 
vote was one year. 
The 1963 statute changed that. By 1963, Minnesota, as well as the rest 
of the country, had adopted an expansive system of parole and probation.268 
In 1965, the average parole period in the United States was twenty-nine 
months.269 Of the 89,900 people released from prison in 1965, 54,300 were 
placed on parole.270 The enactment of section 609.165, therefore, extended 
the period of disenfranchisement for the majority of convicted felons in 
Minnesota by an average of seventeen months. While the statute 
automatically restored civil rights, the law still required an extension of 
disenfranchisement for the majority of those on probation, parole, or 
another form of supervised release.271 In fact, given the new probation and 
parole system, the l963 statute was the most restrictive statute that the state 
had ever enacted regarding felon disenfranchisement. Before 1907, the 
1867 statute immediately reinstated civil rights to all convicted felons who 
finished a prison sentence without having any disciplinary violations.272 Thus, 
convicted felons with no disciplinary violations automatically had their civil 
rights restored after release from prison from 1867 to 1907. In 1907, the 
statute changed, requiring a maximum waiting period of one year.273 In 
contrast, the 1963 statute, section 609.165, more than doubled the average 
waiting period.274 Although the legislature claimed that the purpose of the 
statute contemplated the “rehabilitation of those convicted,” it provided no 
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explanation for extending disenfranchisement until after the completion of 
probation and parole rather than upon release from prison.275 
The rational basis standard in Minnesota requires “a reasonable 
connection between the actual, and not just the theoretical, effect of the 
challenged classification and the statutory goals.”276 The actual effect of 
section 609.165 was to extend the minimum disenfranchisement period for 
the majority of those convicted of felonies in Minnesota. While, 
theoretically, the legislature may have believed that an automatic system of 
re-enfranchisement would lead to increased enfranchisement, the statute 
actually decreased enfranchisement. The legislature chose to make 
convicted felons wait until after the completion of their probation or parole, 
rather than after completion of incarceration, to vote.  
Moreover, the legislature stated that the goal of the statute 
contemplated the “rehabilitation of those convicted.”277 Again, Minnesota 
law looks at the actual, not theoretical, effect of a law.278 While, theoretically, 
the legislature could have believed that section 609.165 would promote 
rehabilitation, in reality, research shows that democratic participation is 
positively associated with a reduction in recidivism.279 One study found that 
voting behavior is “significantly correlated with subsequent measures of 
incarceration, re-arrest, and self-reported criminality.”280 Additionally, 
disenfranchisement is more stigmatizing than reintegrative because it serves 
to further isolate an individual from society.281 The State, in its 
memorandum, did not detail any evidence that section 609.165 has had a 
real positive effect on rehabilitation.282 The theoretical belief that the statute 
would promote rehabilitation is not enough to survive Minnesota’s rational 
basis review. Without such evidence, the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim 
should prevail. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Felon disenfranchisement is a topic that has gained traction in recent 
years. Courts around the country have been tasked with assessing the 
constitutionality of these laws, and Minnesota is amongst the states that have 
faced this question. Under federal precedent, these laws are difficult to 
strike down, and only a handful of cases have been successful, all requiring 
a showing of discriminatory intent. Recognizing the federal barrier, a recent 
Minnesota state court case, Schroeder v. Minnesota Secretary of State, 
argued that Minnesota’s felon disenfranchisement statute violates 
Minnesota’s Constitution.283 The district court ultimately held that the power 
to regulate felon disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement lies exclusively 
with the legislative branch, a holding that was affirmed by the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals.284 While this may be true to an extent, the legislature’s 
ability to regulate enfranchisement should not go unconstrained. 
Article VII’s sanction of felon disenfranchisement should be read 
narrowly, taking into account the historical use of such laws and any relevant 
historical definitions. Under this reading, any expansion of felon 
disenfranchisement, including the expansion contained in section 609.165, 
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. At a minimum, the court should 
apply Minnesota’s heightened rational standard of review. Under either 
heightened standard, section 609.165 would likely be deemed 
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Ramsey County court was hesitant to 
apply either standard of review. 
Across the country, felon disenfranchisement laws are enforced and 
upheld. Rather than looking domestically, however, courts should look for 
guidance abroad. On a global scale, the United States is a clear outlier, and 
our disenfranchisement laws have been repeatedly condemned by 
international observers. On an international level, a decision to strike down 
a felon disenfranchisement law as violative of Minnesota’s state constitution 
would not be revolutionary. In fact, even disenfranchising incarcerated 
felons would be more extreme than the approach in most European 
countries. Although the law would support such a decision, it seems unlikely 
that the Minnesota Supreme Court will reverse the decision of the Ramsey 
County and Minnesota Court of Appeals. While the courts clearly have the 
authority to strike down the felon disenfranchisement law, they have proven 
unwilling to do so. The power remains in the hands of the legislature, and 
it will be up to them to amend or repeal the law.   
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